#Real-world scenarios

Concrete products you can build with Owl ID. Each shows the user-facing flow plus the SDK calls that drive it.

Two building blocks recur:

• Disclosures — plain SD-JWT VC claims (given_name, nationalities, …). The holder reveals only the ones your DCQL query asks for.
• Predicates — facts proven by the holder's wallet in zero knowledge on the device, then attested on Midnight (age_over_18, verification_level, nationality_eu, resident, email_verified, unique_person). The underlying value never leaves the wallet; you request the predicate and verify / requestPresentation enforce it. See How Owl ID works.

requestPresentation returns a VerifyDcqlResponse — valid plus a perCredential map keyed by your DCQL credentials[].id.

#1. Age gate for a bar / venue

Goal: confirm a customer is 18+ before serving alcohol. No name, no birthday — just the green check.

import { OwlVerifier } from '@owlid/sdk'

const verifier = new OwlVerifier({ apiKey: process.env.OWLID_API_KEY! })

const result = await verifier.requestPresentation({
  verifierName: 'Acme Bar',
  dcql: {
    credentials: [{ id: 'cred0', format: 'dc+sd-jwt', claims: [{ path: ['age_over_18'] }] }],
  },
  onQr: (qrPayload) => terminal.showQr(qrPayload),
  timeoutMs: 60_000,
})

if (result.valid) bar.allowEntry()
else bar.deny(result.error)

age_over_18 is a predicate: the wallet derives the holder's age from their credential, proves age ≥ 18 in zero knowledge on the device, and Midnight records an attestation. The bar sees valid: true and the issuer's did:web identifier — never the name, exact age, birthdate, address, or document number.

Privacy properties

• The witness (the birthdate) is consumed inside the on-device proof and never leaves the wallet.
• The verifier nonce is single-use — a recorded presentation cannot be replayed.
• The KB-JWT is signed by a wallet-held key the holder unlocked with their passkey; the wallet never exports the key.
• The first proof on a device takes a few seconds; the attestation is then reused across every later age check.

#2. Proof of unique humanity — anti-bot signup

Goal: a forum, waitlist, or community wants one account per real human — no bots, no mass fake signups — without learning anyone's identity.

This is the unique_person predicate. The verifier picks a 32-byte scope: an epoch (the campaign) and an app_id (your app). The wallet proves the holder controls a unique personhood secret and derives a per-scope nullifier; Midnight rejects a second claim under the same scope. One human can attest once — and stays uncorrelated across other apps and campaigns.

import { OwlVerifier } from '@owlid/sdk'

const verifier = new OwlVerifier({ apiKey: process.env.OWLID_API_KEY! })

// `epoch` + `app_id` are 32-byte hex (64 hex chars) you control.
// `epoch` = the campaign scope, `app_id` = your application.
// Keep both stable to enforce "one signup per human, ever".
const EPOCH = 'a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90'
const APP_ID = 'ac4ed00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001'

const result = await verifier.requestPresentation({
  verifierName: 'Acme Community',
  dcql: {
    credentials: [
      {
        id: 'cred0',
        format: 'dc+sd-jwt',
        claims: [{ path: ['unique_person'], values: [{ epoch: EPOCH, app_id: APP_ID }] }],
      },
    ],
  },
  onQr: (payload) => signup.showQr(payload),
})

if (result.valid) signup.createAccount()
else signup.deny('Already registered, or not a verified human.')

The signup form learns nothing else — no email, no document, no profile data — and gets bot-resistance and one-account-per-human for free. A user who already signed up cannot do it twice: their nullifier for this (epoch, app_id) is already on-chain.

Pick the scope deliberately. Reuse the same epoch everywhere you want "one claim total" (one signup ever). Rotate the epoch per season/round when you want "one claim per round". Different app_ids never correlate to the same human.

#3. Ticketing without scalping

Goal: gate a paid event. Each ticket is a credential issued at purchase; at the door the holder proves the ticket and that they are a unique human — so a screenshot, a resold QR, or one person walking in ten friends all fail.

Issuance — when someone buys a ticket, your back office mints a credential bound to the buyer's wallet key:

import { OwlIssuer } from '@owlid/sdk'

const issuer = new OwlIssuer({ apiKey: process.env.OWLID_API_KEY! })

const session = await issuer.startSession('owlcon-checkout')
await issuer.submitClaims(session.id, {
  event_id: 'OWLCON-2026',
  tier: 'vip',
  ticket_id: ticket.id,
})
const credential = await issuer.issue(session.id, {
  publicKey: holderPublicKey,
  algorithm: 'ed25519',
})
// hand `credential.sdJwtVc` to the buyer's wallet to store

At the door — the scanner asks for the event + tier disclosures and a unique-person proof scoped to this event:

import { OwlVerifier } from '@owlid/sdk'

const verifier = new OwlVerifier({ apiKey: process.env.OWLID_DOOR_KEY! })

// 32-byte hex scope (64 hex chars) — one entry per human for this event.
const EPOCH = 'e7e0700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000202601'
const APP_ID = 'd00r500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0b12'

const result = await verifier.requestPresentation({
  verifierName: 'OwlCon 2026 Entrance',
  dcql: {
    credentials: [
      {
        id: 'cred0',
        format: 'dc+sd-jwt',
        claims: [
          { path: ['event_id'] },
          { path: ['tier'] },
          { path: ['unique_person'], values: [{ epoch: EPOCH, app_id: APP_ID }] },
        ],
      },
    ],
  },
  onQr: (payload) => scanner.showQr(payload),
  timeoutMs: 30_000,
})

const subjects = result.perCredential.cred0?.subjects
if (result.valid && subjects?.event_id === 'OWLCON-2026' && subjects?.tier === 'vip') {
  scanner.unlockGate()
}

Why it beats QR-image tickets

• The KB-JWT binds to the door's single-use nonce — a screenshot replays as valid: false, and the wallet signs each presentation fresh with the holder's unlocked key.
• The unique_person proof, scoped to this event's epoch, lets each human through once. A resold or shared ticket fails the second scan: the buyer's nullifier for this event is already on-chain.
• If a ticket is refunded or charged back, the issuer revokes the credential; the door sees it in real time via subscribeRevocations.
• Hidden disclosures stay hidden — put the buyer's name in the credential for support without the door scanner ever asking for it.

Multi-day passes — use a distinct epoch per day; the same credential then admits each human once per day.

#4. KYC-gated onboarding

Goal: a remote-work or fintech platform requires every user to have completed at least KYC tier 2 with any approved provider.

const result = await verifier.requestPresentation({
  verifierName: 'Acme Talent',
  dcql: {
    credentials: [
      {
        id: 'cred0',
        format: 'dc+sd-jwt',
        claims: [
          { path: ['given_name'] },
          { path: ['family_name'] },
          { path: ['verification_level'], values: ['substantial'] },
        ],
      },
    ],
  },
  onQr: (payload) => onboarding.showQr(payload),
})

const subjects = result.perCredential.cred0?.subjects
if (result.valid) {
  await onboarding.complete({
    firstName: subjects?.given_name,
    lastName: subjects?.family_name,
  })
}

given_name / family_name come back as plain disclosures. verification_level is a predicate — the wallet proves the KYC threshold ('basic' / 'substantial' / 'high', or a numeric level) on-device and the verifier confirms the on-chain attestation. The platform never sees the underlying KYC report or document image.

#5. EU-only marketplace

Goal: a service operates only in the EU and needs to confirm sellers are EU nationals — without learning the exact country.

const result = await verifier.requestPresentation({
  verifierName: 'EU Marketplace',
  dcql: {
    credentials: [{ id: 'cred0', format: 'dc+sd-jwt', claims: [{ path: ['nationality_eu'] }] }],
  },
  onQr: (payload) => listing.renderQr(payload),
})

if (result.valid) listing.publish()

nationality_eu is a set-membership predicate: the wallet proves the holder's nationality is in the approved EU set in zero knowledge. The verifier learns only the boolean — not which country. (To collect the specific country instead, request the nationalities disclosure.)

#6. Fair distribution — one human, one claim

Goal: an airdrop, a public-goods grant, or a one-person-one-vote ballot must reach each real human exactly once. No sybil farms, no wallet-splitting.

import { OwlVerifier } from '@owlid/sdk'

const verifier = new OwlVerifier({ apiKey: process.env.OWLID_API_KEY! })

// 32-byte hex scope — bump `epoch` each round so every human can claim again.
const EPOCH = '00c7a0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ee00'
const APP_ID = '00d0a0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000bb00'

const result = await verifier.requestPresentation({
  verifierName: 'OwlDAO Grant Round 7',
  dcql: {
    credentials: [
      {
        id: 'cred0',
        format: 'dc+sd-jwt',
        claims: [{ path: ['unique_person'], values: [{ epoch: EPOCH, app_id: APP_ID }] }],
      },
    ],
  },
  onQr: (payload) => claim.showQr(payload),
})

if (result.valid) await disburse(claim.recipientAddress)

Each human's nullifier for owldao-grant-round-7 lands on-chain on first claim, so a second attempt — even from a different wallet or device — fails. The DAO learns "a unique human claimed", never who. Rotate the epoch to round-8 next time and every human can claim again.

#7. Email-verified contact, age-bracketed content

Goal: smaller checks that pair a predicate with a disclosure.

// Newsletter — confirm a provider-verified email without an email round-trip.
dcql: {
  credentials: [
    {
      id: 'cred0',
      format: 'dc+sd-jwt',
      claims: [{ path: ['email_verified'] }, { path: ['email'] }],
    },
  ]
}

// Mature content — 21+ without name or birthday.
dcql: {
  credentials: [{ id: 'cred0', format: 'dc+sd-jwt', claims: [{ path: ['age_over_21'] }] }]
}

// Resident-only service — verified residency, no address.
dcql: {
  credentials: [{ id: 'cred0', format: 'dc+sd-jwt', claims: [{ path: ['resident'] }] }]
}

email_verified, age_over_21, resident are predicates (proven on-device); email is a plain disclosure the holder reveals alongside the proof.

#8. Stolen-device credential revocation

Goal: a user's phone is stolen. The issuer revokes the credential; subsequent verifications fail immediately and verifiers can drop cached results.

Issuer side (operator dashboard or back office):

POST /revocations/revoke
{ "credentialId": "...", "issuerPublicKey": "...", "reason": "device-lost" }

Requires an API key with the admin permission. The verification service writes through to the on-chain revocation_registry (via the sidecar) and broadcasts the change over /ws/revocations.

Verifier side, optional live invalidation:

const unsubscribe = verifier.subscribeRevocations((event) => {
  cache.invalidate(event.credentialId)
})

The next verify() call returns { valid: false, error: 'Credential revoked' }. The signed statuslist+jwt at the issuer's /status/{id} reflects the change on its next fetch — the verifier consults both the live mirror and the status list.

#9. GDPR right-to-erasure

Goal: an EU resident exercises their right to be forgotten. Their identifying data on the platform is anonymized; cryptographic audit trails remain hash-only.

The user (or their support rep) triggers erasure from the operator dashboard. The platform:

1. Revokes every active credential bound to the holder's credential_id set.
2. Replaces stored claim data with anonymized placeholders.
3. Retains hash-only audit records (compliance) but strips PII.
4. Returns a signed receipt the user keeps as proof.

Owl ID is designed so the platform mostly stores hashes already — there is very little PII to erase. The flow exists for compliance, not because the system retains a copy of the user's documents.

#Common patterns

• Render the QR full-screen so phones don't have to crop the camera frame.
• Use a short challenge TTL (60 s) for unattended kiosks, longer (5 min) for online flows.
• Cache verification results keyed by credential_id hash; expire on TTL or a revocation push event.
• Choose unique_person scopes deliberately — a stable epoch for "once ever", a rotating epoch for "once per round". Different app_ids never correlate.
• Expect a one-time delay the first time a holder proves a predicate on a new device (a few seconds of on-device proving); it is reused after that.
• Map result.error to friendly messages — the platform returns codes like Credential revoked, KB-JWT audience mismatch, Untrusted issuer, predicate not attested.
• For unlinkability across verifiers, ask the issuer for a Batch (OwlIssuer.issueBatch) and present a fresh one-time-use credential each time.